

Report

December 2022



‘AND EVERYTHING BECAME WAR’

Warrap State Since the Signing
of the R-ARCSS


Joshua Craze



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A publication of the Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan project with support from the US Department of State

Credits

Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

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First published in December 2022

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ISBN 978-2-940747-00-9

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This Report was funded by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

Cover photo: A cattle guard moves with his herd near Tonj, South Sudan.

Source: Alex McBride/AFP

About the author

Joshua Craze is a fellow at *Type Investigations* with over a decade of experience as a researcher in Sudan and South Sudan. He has worked in the two countries for the Small Arms Survey, Human Rights Watch, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Geneva Call, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Tufts University, and the London School of Economics and Political Science, among other institutions and organizations. He has a PhD in Socio-Cultural Anthropology from the University of California, Berkeley, and also studied at the University of Oxford, l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, and the University of Amsterdam. His essays and reportage on Sudan and South Sudan have been published by *The Baffler*, *The Guardian*, the *New Left Review*, *n+1*, *Creative Time Reports*, and *Al Jazeera*, among many other publications. He is currently writing a book for Fitzcarraldo Editions on war, bureaucracy, and silence in South Sudan.

The HSBA project

The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan is a multi-year project administered by the Small Arms Survey. It was developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme, and a wide array of international and Sudanese partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes and incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, as well as security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity.

Publications in Arabic, English, and French are available at: www.smallarmssurvey.org

The HSBA receives direct financial support from the US Department of State. It has received support in the past from the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the UK government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, as well as from the Danish Demining Group, the National Endowment for Democracy (United States), and the United States Institute of Peace. The Small Arms Survey also receives Swiss funding, without which the HSBA could not be undertaken effectively.

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Acknowledgements

My deep gratitude to all those in Warrap state who were kind enough to share their lives with me in 2021–22, and whom I cannot name here. Additional thanks to the two anonymous reviewers whose comments improved this Report, and to the eternal patience and vigilance of Khristopher Carlson, the Hyperion of the Small Arms Survey’s pantheon. Thanks are also due to the US Department of State and its Bureau of African Affairs for funding this study.

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ISB	Internal Security Bureau
JCE	Jieng Council of Elders
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
NSS	National Security Service
OPP	Opposition Political Parties
R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
R-TGoNU	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSOA	South Sudan Opposition Alliance
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Force
SSR	Security sector reform
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan

Executive summary

In November 2021, much of Greater Awuul, Warrap state—the homeland of Akol Koor Kuc, the director of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB) of the National Security Service (NSS)—was deserted. The population of the Atok subsection of the Rek Dinka to which Kuc belongs had been displaced to the centre of Awuul following attacks by rival Rek Dinka sections. These sections fared no better, due to tit-for-tat revenge attacks.

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed in Addis Ababa in September 2018, was supposed to bring peace to the country. Instead, Warrap state has seen more intense violence over the last four years than during the civil war (2013–18). Since the signing of the peace agreement, the absolute attacks that characterized the South Sudanese civil war, designed to eliminate entire populations, have become the way communities fight each other.

This dynamic is partly due to the transposition of political struggles in Juba onto sectional conflicts in Warrap, as politicians fight battles in the periphery to jockey for positions in the capital. Even more fundamentally, the violence engulfing Warrap is due to the nature of South Sudan's political system since the signing of the R-ARCSS: sections now fight for absolute territorial borders and engage in zero-sum competitions for administrative positions. The very procedures that were supposed to support state formation in South Sudan, such as the delimitation of county boundaries, have created violent intra-sectional competitions. The creation of the South Sudanese state has led to the collapse of a viable nation-state, by intensifying communitarian antagonisms and redrawing peoples' sense of political identity around narrowly determined local units.

Key findings

- Both Aleu Ayieny Aleu, the governor of Warrap from 2021 to 2022, and Kuc have conducted intensive recruitment campaigns in the state since the signing of the R-ARCSS, and have relied on recruited personnel during violent campaigns of repression.
- Since the signing of the R-ARCSS, the form of clashes between communities in Greater Tonj has shifted and now echoes the strategies of the belligerent parties during the South Sudanese civil war: attacks target medical facilities and villages, and are designed to impair communities' capacity to sustain life.
- These clashes emerge in direct response to the political system established by the R-ARCSS, which encourages zero-sum competitions for administrative positions and territorial boundaries between Dinka sections.
- The disarmament campaign of 2020 in Warrap was partisan—designed to punish communities for supporting Kuc—and resulted in violence, as did the disarmament campaign of 2022, led by Aleu. The troops responsible for carrying out these campaigns are partisan proponents of particular commanders and their ethnic constituents.
- Following unsuccessful challenges by Nhial Deng Nhial and Rin Tueny Mabor in 2019–20, Kuc is in command of the political and military infrastructure of Warrap. After Aleu fell out with Kuc, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir removed Aleu as governor in November 2022, leaving Kuc the undisputed power in Warrap state.
- Aleu attempted to stamp his authority on the state through the use of extrajudicial killings, the detention of customary authorities, and the targeting of dissident populations; however, he failed to prevent violence in Warrap, leading to his dismissal.
- During Aleu's reign, the state government—while involved in security service recruitment—withdrew from security provision and lost political legitimacy. Some customary authorities, subordinated to state actors, have suffered a similar loss of prestige. In their absence, the *gelweng* (Dinka cattle guards) have emerged as the primary providers of security in Warrap, and as the military actors with the most political legitimacy in their respective communities.

“ Since the signing of the R-ARCSS, Kiir’s regime has increased its use of privatized militias, and the state has withdrawn from most areas of administration.”

Introduction

The R-ARCSS was supposed to bring South Sudan's five-year-long civil war to an end, and usher in an era of peace. Instead, much of the country has faced an upsurge of violence in the four years since the signing of the agreement (ACLEDA, 2019; 2021; Craze, 2022a; UNHRC, 2021). Warrap state (see Map 1) has been particularly affected by such violence, witnessing a destructive disarmament campaign in Tonj East in 2020, and clashes in Tonj North, East, and South in 2020–22, along with continued tensions over grazing and livestock between the people of Warrap and those of the neighbouring states of Lakes, Unity, and Western Bahr el Ghazal.¹

There is disagreement among analysts and diplomats over how to characterize such violence. Nicholas Haysom, the head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), has claimed that political violence has decreased since the signing of the R-ARCSS (Haysom, 2021a). Political violence, for him, signifies conflict between the peace agreement's signatories. He argues that the violence that has scarred South Sudan over the last four years is subnational in character and disconnected from the political process (2022); clashes in places such as Warrap are instead determined by cycles of revenge and should be understood as such (2021b). Haysom interprets this violence as a criminal rather than a political matter, and has appealed to the South Sudanese political class to intervene.²

In a 2020 interim report, the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan presented a very different reading of the violence seen in Warrap (UNSC, 2020b, pp. 12–13). In the panel's narrative, a disarmament campaign launched in Tonj East in July 2020, under the command of Lieutenant General Rin Tueny Mabor (also known as 'Janafil'), was designed to undermine Kuc, who was supporting armed actors in the county. The panel found that the resulting explosive violence was due to a battle for power in Juba playing out in Warrap state, and had to be understood in relation to Kiir's efforts to marginalize Kuc.

Such a narrative presents a diametrically opposed argument to that made by Haysom. For Haysom, violence in Warrap is distinct from the political situation in Juba, and should be dealt with through further state involvement; the government is responsible for protecting the peripheries. According to the panel, however, violence in Warrap is the direct result of Juba's intervention; political actors are the problem, not the solution. For Haysom, the state exists as a neutral actor, whereas for the panel the state is a collection of warring politicians.

This Report contends that both Haysom's narrative and that of the UN Panel of Experts, despite containing elements of truth, fail to fully understand the violence in Warrap. Both narratives place too much emphasis on the actors involved, as if they were autonomous moral agents capable of acting differently. While Haysom's narrative holds that the government should prevent violence, the panel's narrative suggests that the politicians should stop creating it. Both pay insufficient attention to

Map 1 Warrap state



Base map data source: OpenStreetMap

the political economic structures created by the R-ARCSS, which partly determine the frameworks that give meaning to the actions of political actors. The Report sets out to analyse the consequences of the R-ARCSS on political and military action in Warrap.

Just as the panel contends, politicians have instrumentalized *gelweng*³ to attack the constituencies of other members of the elite, as a way to pressure Kiir to replace incumbent county commissioners.⁴ These elites, however, are not simply motivated by evil. Violence in contemporary South Sudan is a rational political tool; politicians are responding to the incentive structures created by the peace agreement. Under the R-ARCSS, almost all state-level appointments, from county commissioners to state governors, are made via a power-sharing agreement. This technocratic structure has resulted in the creation of a centralized despotism in which the Offices of the President and the First Vice President control almost all political appointments in the country (Craze and Markó, 2022).⁵ During fieldwork carried out for this Report in November 2021, people across Warrap complained about unaccountable county commissioners, away in Juba, where the political calculus surrounding appointments is determined. Under the R-ARCSS, the success of a politician is dictated not by their level of popularity at the local level, but by a competition for power in the capital, in which violence in Warrap is used to destabilize rivals.

In Warrap, the forces involved in such jockeying for position tend to be *gelweng* cattle guards, which have a long history of being instrumentalized. During the second Sudanese civil war (1983–2005), the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) used the *gelweng* as auxiliary troops in its struggle with Khartoum (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999); however, the *gelweng* also used the SPLA to achieve their own objectives, from acquiring resources to securing relative autonomy from structures of customary authority (Pendle, 2015). Since the civil war, this mutually constitutive relationship between the South Sudanese military and the *gelweng* has continued to transform the political economy of Warrap state.⁶

During the South Sudanese civil war (2013–18), rather than rely on a multi-ethnic SPLA already riven by defections, Kiir’s regime used mono-ethnic Dinka militias, such as the Mathiang Anyoor (Boswell, 2019), in its struggle with Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) (Craze, 2019; Young, 2015; 2016; 2019). This continued a trend evident since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005: Kiir has reigned by using ethnically recruited security forces organized outside the formal ambit of the state.

After the CPA, the incorporation of militia forces within the SPLA following the Juba Declaration in 2006 (Snowden, 2012; de Waal, 2014) turned the national army into a site for commanders to leverage violence or the threat of it to push for better ranks or resources from the government (Craze, 2020). In the CPA era (2005–11), the SPLA was united not by a sense of identity or shared command structure, but by a common

investment in a political economy based on ranks, wages, and the redistribution of resources from Juba. It is in this context that the political elite of Bahr el Ghazal chose to create mono-ethnic militias—a more reliable choice than the army. The privatization of the security sector in South Sudan, through the sponsorship of ethnic militias, was a response to the monetization of violence and the fragmentation of the military hierarchy of the SPLA that followed the Juba Declaration—insofar as mono-ethnic communitarian forces were considered more reliable than mercenary generals. However, this privatization also intensified the process of fragmentation within South Sudan’s military sphere, since the creation of multiple militias under the direct control of politicians and commanders further undermined the possibility of a unified national army.

Since the signing of the R-ARCSS, Kiir’s regime has increased its use of privatized militias, and the state has withdrawn from most areas of administration. The South Sudanese government has never invested in service provision, especially following the fiscal crisis that has marked the country since 2018, and has instead relied on the humanitarian community. Since the signing of the peace agreement, it has also stopped providing wages and security. Kiir’s regime has instead taken a leaf from Khartoum’s playbook (Thomas and El Gizouli, 2021), and used violence as a tool to manage recalcitrant populations, by employing private, informal militias to predate upon the communities of South Sudan while extracting resources from the peripheries of the country (Pinaud, 2021b).

In Warrap, as the state has withdrawn from the activities that might have offered it legitimacy on the ground, the very forces it instrumentalized, such as the *gelweng*, have enabled communities to try to resist violent incursions against them—incursions often made by state-backed actors. Whereas the *gelweng* were once primarily responsible for looking after livestock, they now consider that their role extends to providing community protection more generally (Pendle, 2015; 2021). Given the erosion of many forms of customary authority in Warrap state—which have either been instrumentalized by the state or seen their power diluted—it is these community defence forces that now have political legitimacy.

If the emergence of the *gelweng* as community defence forces is considered within the context of South Sudan’s transformed political economy since the signing of the R-ARCSS, it is evident that both Haysom and the panel’s explanations of violence in places such as Warrap are found wanting. While it is true that the *gelweng* play a role within inter-communal clashes, as Haysom suggests, these incidents must be understood as political. They are a reaction to the simultaneous withdrawal of state provision of security and the instrumentalization of communitarian forces by politicians in Juba. The violence occurring in Warrap is not because of the absence of the state, but rather because the structure of politics in Juba creates incentives for politicians to create disorder in the periphery as a means of gaining administrative power in the

centre. Violence has become a tool used to fracture opposing political forces and compete for political office (Craze, 2021).

As the panel suggests, politicians are indeed instrumentalizing communitarian forces; however, contrary to the panel's narrative, in which local groups are merely the instruments of national politicians, the gelweng are creatively reimagining their world to contest the illegitimacies of the current peace agreement, while trying to navigate the competing moral claims that surround political action in Warrap state today (Cormack, 2016; Pendle, 2018). Violence in Warrap can only be understood relative to both the absence of government and its violent presence. ●

“Increased power in Juba for actors from Warrap has been accompanied by a decrease in legitimacy for the national government and intensified intra-sectional violence.”

Background

According to one recent interpretation of South Sudan’s history, the period since the signing of the CPA in 2005 must be understood in terms of the making of a ‘violent predatory Dinka ethnocracy’ (Pinaud, 2021a, p. 4). Such a narrative fails to make sense of some of the central trends of the last decade, including the reliance of Kiir’s regime on both the Bul Nuer political elite and, more recently, the Eastern Nuer commanders that it has peeled away from the SPLA-IO (Craze, 2022b).⁷ Pinaud’s narrative also fails to capture the way that absolutist claims to belonging are occurring in South Sudan at an intra-sectional—and not just an ethnic—level, in response to the state-building process itself, rather than because of a campaign of Dinka domination.

Pinaud’s narrative also makes a claim for far more unity within the Dinka ethnic group than is empirically correct; since 2013, South Sudan has seen both increased ethnic conflict between the Dinka and other groups and increased intra-Dinka division. The overarching narrative that can make sense of South Sudan’s violence is not one of Dinka ethnocracy, but one in which predatory state actors use division and fragmentation as a means of control. While such division is often ethnicized, over-emphasizing the ethnic element of this fragmentation blunts our understanding of the political and material structures behind it.

The situation in Warrap state is exemplary of the way in which South Sudan’s political economy has created intensified forms of intra-Dinka sectional competition. Other than minority populations in Tonj South, Warrap is a mono-ethnic Dinka state, principally divided into the Rek Dinka in Tonj (along with the Luanyjang in Tonj East); the Aguok, Apuk, Awan, and Kuac in Gogrial; and the Twic in their eponymous county (see Table 1 for a detailed breakdown of Dinka sections in Warrap). Violence in the state since the signing of the R-ARCSS has been between feuding Dinka groups, sponsored by the elite in Juba. Though Kiir is from Warrap, along with much of South Sudan’s political class, the triumph of this elite has not created a unified Dinka community in Warrap. Instead, its elite’s dominance since the signing of the R-ARCSS has increased divisions within Warrap.

The power of Warrap’s political class has worked against the state’s residents. Given the group’s control over South Sudan’s external flows of revenue, it remains relatively immune to the demands of its constituents. A weaker set of politicians—such as that of Western Bahr el Ghazal state—is more beholden to its population than the elite of Warrap, who are focused on political power and financial resources in Juba, not Kuajok. This has meant that the Warrap elite feel little need to support their constituents with services or infrastructure. In areas such as Tonj North, where Kuc is from, there has been little development. Instead, increased power in Juba for actors from Warrap has been accompanied by a decrease in legitimacy for the national government and intensified intra-sectional violence.

The critical divide that explains these developments is not between ethnic groups, but rather between the political and military class that emerged during the second Sudanese civil war—which Pinaud was one of the first to critically assess (Pinaud, 2014; 2015; 2016)—and a militarized labour surplus of young men, captured and instrumentalized by a political class that fails to control it.⁸ The roots of this class divide, and the mutual instrumentalization that characterizes it, lie in Sudan’s second civil war (1983–2005). A full account of this period in Warrap lies beyond the scope of this Report. Instead, this section will focus on the principal socio-structural shifts in Warrap that have set current conflict dynamics in motion.⁹

The diagram of power in Warrap state is triangular. It comprises the following points: the political and military elite that emerged during the second civil war; the customary authorities of the communities of Warrap; and the *gelweng*.¹⁰ Over the last 40 years, the political economy of Warrap has become increasingly militarized, which has presented both opportunities and risks to all three points of the triangle.

Since the 1970s, Dinka communities in southern Sudan have transformed the moral codes through which they understand conflict, initially in relation to the first Sudanese civil war (1956–72), and then in response to the encroachment of the Sudanese state during the decade that followed the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 (Deng, 2010). These transformations continued apace during the second Sudanese civil war (1983–2005), when communities in Warrap supported the SPLA—both voluntarily and involuntarily—with resources and recruits. SPLA commanders during this period relied on external resources to entrench themselves at the top of an emerging military hierarchy that predated upon—but also demanded support from—the areas under its control (Nyaba, 1997).

To defeat the SPLA, Khartoum used militia forces, known as the *murahaleen*, to attack the rebel force in the broader Bahr el Ghazal region, of which Warrap is a part (de Waal, 1993). Attacks in Bahr el Ghazal by these groups destroyed settlements and food stores, looted livestock, and targeted civilians (Keen, 2008), in a grim prefiguration of the campaigns that the SPLA would conduct during the South Sudanese civil war. The *murahaleen* attacks did not intend to defeat the SPLA militarily, but rather to displace and destroy the populations that supported it.

Warrap also suffered raids from Khartoum-backed militias, known as the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), under the command of the Bul Nuer general Paulino Matiep, which were located in what was then Western Upper Nile (now Unity state), on Warrap’s eastern border (Craze and Tübiana, 2016). The SPLA also fought with the Twic Dinka military commander, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, who split from the rebel faction in the 1990s and established a base in Gogrial. Warrap thus found itself under attack from multiple actors.

In order to defend communities against this swathe of enemies, the SPLA armed the *gelweng* (Kuol, 2017; Pendle, 2015; 2021). Such cattle guards are traditionally

organized within sections by age group. Their primary role, as their name suggests, is to guard the livestock that are central to the material and symbolic economy of the Dinka (Lienhardt, 1961). The *gelweng* would also temporarily come together to protect communities against external threats. During the 1980s and 1990s, the SPLA attempted to formalize these militias as a means of providing communities with protection, and to create additional troops to fight alongside the rebel movement.¹¹

This militarization of the *gelweng* changed their organizational structure. The SPLA tried to halt the *gelweng*'s organization by age group, as well as competition between such groups, and instead sought to mobilize larger groups of cattle guards—which would be better able to act against the *murahaleen*—through ethnically based calls for Dinka defence (Wild, Jok, and Patel, 2018). The SPLA also characterized the conflicts in which it employed the *gelweng* as military in nature, and thus ruled by fewer moral codes than intra- and inter-sectional cattle raiding. The tragedy of the period since 2018 is that it is this overturning of moral codes, designed to enable the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal to successfully combat Khartoum, that has determined the form of violent intra-sectional Dinka fighting.

The overcoming of communitarian senses of belonging by militarized forms of identity was most marked among conscripts to the SPLA (Berger, 2022). The SPLA used violence and patronage to transfer the familial and sectional loyalties of its soldiers to their commanders (Hutchinson, 1996; Pinaud, 2014). While the cattle guards also experienced divided loyalties, they remained in their home areas and were not fully integrated into the SPLA. Customary authorities tended to act as mediators between the SPLA and the cattle guards.¹² As Leonardi argues (2007), during the second civil war, young cattle guards were caught between the twin poles of *hakuma*, or government, and home, not fully belonging to either.

This tripartite relationship presented both opportunities and risks to each of the three groups. For customary authorities, favoured status with the SPLA offered the possibility of security, resources, and increased power. Such status might allow for the growth of markets (Pendle and Madut Anei, 2018) in a given chief's territory, and enable the retrenchment of chieftaincy as the institution that controlled customary courts and made decisions over the redistribution of livestock following legal cases. The process of militarization, however, also weakened customary authorities, which were increasingly dependent on obtaining military and political support from within the SPLA in order to secure power. Simultaneously, cattle guards, supplied with guns, were often less responsive to chiefly authority, as they used their incorporation within militarized logics of conflict to build up resources that would enable them to gain respect and power independently of customary authorities.

The SPLA also found itself in a transformed world. While the *gelweng* protected areas under SPLA control, their militarization gave the cattle guards increasing autonomy from the military commanders that had armed them. Furthermore, the blurring of the

line between militarized violence and customary conflict soon characterized violence within Warrap, which, from the signing of the CPA onwards, often resembled the absolute conflict of the second civil war, rather than the delimited, chief-mediated conflict that had previously occurred among Dinka sections.

The CPA period

During the second Sudanese civil war, a political and military elite emerged in southern Sudan; it is this elite that took power—first of southern Sudan’s regional government and then, following South Sudan’s secession, of the South Sudanese state. After the death of John Garang in 2005, Kiir’s ascent to the summit of southern Sudanese politics saw a move away from the ‘Garang boys’, loyal to the previous head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and a pivot towards an elite from the Bahr el Ghazal region. These elites had built up powerful economic and military empires during the second civil war by preying upon and taxing the populations under their control.

Following the signing of the CPA, the basic structure of southern Sudanese politics remained intact, but the inputs changed. Rather than using war-time predation and the diversion of humanitarian aid, Warrap-based elites in Juba relied on the oil revenues flowing into the coffers of the regional government, and diverted donor funds and developmental project grants. The patronage networks consolidated by such flows created an elite that was increasingly independent of the rest of the country. Juba became the centre of political power, and the rest of the country lacked importance except as sources of the revenue (external oil flows and extractive industries) on which the country’s elite depended.

That is not to say, however, that the enrichment of the Warrap elite had no impact on the state. Many politicians used their access to external resources to build up large herds back in their home areas (Catley, 2018). These herds, to some extent, drove up bridewealth prices (Sommers and Schwartz, 2011), though the degree to which this is an explanatory factor for conflict in Warrap has been significantly overstated.¹³ In order to protect their herds, politicians and military commanders conscripted cattle guards—often on the basis of patronage systems they had built up during the second civil war. Relations between politicians and cattle guards were, for the most part, not mediated by either the SPLA or customary authorities. These privatized relations were more ethnicized: individual commanders relied on sectional militarized labour, meaning that sectional (and ethnic) identity was increasingly tied to the fate of particular commanders and elite actors, who encouraged their constituencies to consider group identity in relation to these actors’ access to power and positions.

Furthermore, from the CPA period onwards, Juba-based elites offered one of the only ways for young men to imagine an aspirational future for themselves. In November

2021, cattle guards in Thiet said that in return for guarding the herds of the elite they received the milk from the herd, supplies to sustain themselves, a limited number of livestock or calves, and, most crucially, materiel in order to protect the cattle. Such relationships further deepened hierarchical forms of power established during the second civil war.

The politicization of herd ownership worsened the fallout from cattle raiding in Warrap, obligating cattle guards to raid in order to recover cattle now owned by the Juba elite. Given the sectional organization of the cattle guards, although the herds were owned by individual politicians or commanders, the consequences of a raid would be felt throughout a given section; attacks on politicians' herds were seen as attacks on entire communities, leading to the kind of cyclical attacks that have consumed Greater Tonj over the last two years.

The inter-sectional consequences of such raids are exacerbated by the elite in Juba. Politicians instrumentalize narrowly defined sectional identities in order to mobilize constituencies to support their political bids for administrative positions. Such positions are often seen as possessions to be fought over in zero-sum competitions between sections. The section that gains a given administrative position is rewarded with political power and control of the wages and resources that accrue to such positions.

These competitions have led to a narrowing sense of political identity around the country that is centred on the immediate sections to which individuals belong, rather than the national political compact that the international community hoped would be built following the signing of the CPA. Despite dreams of building a development state in 2005–11, no political institutions were created. Nor was state capacity expanded outside of the security sector. Instead, the state's administrative tools were used to gerrymander districts, arrogate land to the exclusive control of one group or another, and create a landscape of deeply uneven development in South Sudan.

An attempt to formalize land boundaries in South Sudan following the signing of the CPA made these competitions especially tense, as it led to opportunities to profit from land ownership (Deng, 2011; 2014). The transition to a politics predicated on the absolute lines of national sovereignty and formalized boundaries between groups—after the flexible borders that had determined relations between pastoralist and agriculturalist populations for much of the 20th century in places such as Warrap—was always going to be difficult. South Sudan's transition has been nightmarish: competition over the delimitation of administrative boundaries has become a zero-sum game, with each group acting as a mini-state and making maximal, exclusive claims to territory—a situation that has upset the delicate reciprocal ties needed to enable pastoralist movement (Cormack, 2016; Craze, 2011; 2013a; 2013b; Leonardi and Santschi, 2016).

During the 1990s, many sections in Gogrial expressed a shared sense of belonging, oriented around communal grazing lands. The market of Mayen Rual, which emerged

at the interstices of several communities, was an expression of this shared identity (Pendle and Madut Anei, 2018). With the end of the war, however, the market's importance diminished due to the emergence of government elites and the increasingly central role played by the state government in Kuajok. The Apuk and Aguok then began to compete for control of territory as a direct response to the attempted formalization of their boundaries following the signing of the CPA.

The violence that took place between the Apuk and Aguok in 2007–08 reemerged during the South Sudanese civil war in 2016–17 and took on a more intense character, with homes and farms burned. In Warrap, attempts to resolve antagonisms over different forms of border—such as grazing borders or sectional borders—are complicated by the fact that administrative units are often directly mapped onto Dinka territorial sections, thus encouraging an absolutist approach to territory (Cormack, 2016).

These tensions over borders emerged as a result of the way the South Sudanese state was created. The political elite in Juba exacerbated these tensions as a means of motivating loyal constituencies, rallying support, and recruiting military forces along ethnic and sectional lines. The ethnic character of military force in South Sudan was hastened by the collapse of the only meaningful national institution that existed in South Sudan when the CPA was signed in 2005: the SPLA. While the SPLA was always more of a unified multi-ethnic force in aspiration than reality, the signing of the Juba Declaration in 2006, which integrated Paulino Matiep's SSDF into the SPLA, transformed the national army into a political marketplace, in which political positions were negotiated through the threat or actuality of violence.

The loyalty of the military class to the central state was contingent on the continuous disbursement of rents. For politicians in Bahr el Ghazal, including Kiir and Paul Malong Awan, the seasoned Malual Dinka military commander and then governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal state (2008–14), this led to suspicions about the trustworthiness of the SPLA, and a corresponding increase in mono-ethnic forces outside the ambit of the army. Such forces included the *titweng*, which participated in the April 2012 clashes over the contested territory of Heglig (Wild, Jok, and Patel, 2018), and the Döt ku Beny ('Rescue the President') force, along with other militias (Pendle, 2021).

The CPA period saw the creation of privatized military forces—answerable to particular political actors—whose funding and support derived not from the state, but from the private funds of these actors (even if they were accumulated from state resources). During the South Sudanese civil war, such forces were used to wage campaigns against the SPLA-IO. In Warrap, this created a distended triangle of power: customary authorities—who often supported the political elites in recruiting such forces—found themselves ever more beholden to government actors, while the *gelweng* found their only means of advancement was to be captured by the elite and serve as foot soldiers within an increasingly ethnicized and fractured political landscape.

The South Sudanese civil war

The beginning of the South Sudanese civil war in December 2013 saw a reduction in violence in Warrap state. Intra-Dinka sectional conflict was largely suspended in view of the threat posed by the SPLA-IO, and due to the ethnic dimension of the early stages of the war, which pitted a largely Dinka SPLA (and associated mono-ethnic Dinka militias) against an opposition largely run by Nuer commanders who had served under Paulino Matiep during the second Sudanese civil war (Young, 2015). While Warrap itself did not witness clashes between the SPLA and SPLA-IO, its border with Western Bahr el Ghazal effectively became the frontline between the two belligerent groups for much of the conflict, and mapped onto existing confrontations between Dinka pastoralists from Warrap and Lakes, and agriculturalists in Western Bahr el Ghazal.

As during the 1980s, the South Sudanese civil war saw large-scale recruitment campaigns conducted by Bahr el Ghazal military and political elites—often the same commanders who had led such campaigns during the prior conflict, such as Bol Akot Bol. Since much of the SPLA had defected to the opposition between December 2013 and January 2014, at the beginning of the war, Kiir’s regime became reliant on forces recruited in Bahr el Ghazal. In addition to the Mathiang Anyoor (Boswell, 2019), largely recruited in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, multiple recruitment campaigns by the NSS, under Kuc, were carried out in Tonj in 2017 and 2018. These forces, selected from among the *gelweng*, were semi-integrated into the state security apparatus. The political and military elite of the SPLA required the conscription of youth forces from Bahr el Ghazal to try and maintain its rule—just as it did during the second civil war—indicating the degree to which the state, while formally antagonistic to informal militias, is actually parasitic upon them.

While Warrap experienced relative peace internally, such calm did not characterize its relationship with Unity state. Though the Mayom–Warrap corridor was crucial to government supply lines during the conflict in Unity state from 2014 to 2016, cattle raiding between the Bul Nuer—largely aligned with the government due to Nguen Monytil’s governorship of Unity state—and the Rek Dinka continued. Indeed, for some raiders in Warrap, the relative weakness of the Bul Nuer—the only government-loyalist Nuer population—offered an opportunity, enabled by the weaponry that had flooded into Warrap during the war thanks to government recruitment campaigns. Raiding in Mayom in January, February, April, and June 2014, and again in February and May 2015, secured at least 3,800 cows. As during the CPA period, when the Bul Nuer were thought of as rebels due to the rebellions of Peter Gatdet and Bapiny Monytil (Snowden, 2013), political divisions opened up a space for raiding to occur. This is because, as much as politicians have intensified divisions among communitarian actors in order to instrumentalize them, political divides have also provided spaces in which these actors can try to obtain advantages over their rivals.

The degree of peace that characterized the area of Warrap state, which would be divided into Gogrial, Tonj, and Twic states under the 28-state decree promulgated by Kiir in 2015, should not be overemphasized.¹⁴ The creation of new states in Warrap caused inter-sectional conflict, as the first governor of Gogrial state—Abraham Gum Makwac, a storied SPLA commander from the Apuk section—created 13 counties in the state (nine in Gogrial West and four in Gogrial East), leading to resentment from the Aguok subsection and rising anger about the gerrymandering of county borders and the effect these new borders would have on sectional territorial boundaries. Many Aguok held that Makwac created new counties due to pressure from politicians from Gogrial West close to Kiir—including Lual Deng Kuel and Toor Deng Mawien, both former governors of Warrap. Makwac’s dismissal in January 2017 and replacement by Gregory Deng Kuac, Kiir’s brother-in-law, came amidst rising tensions in Gogrial over community borders. A variety of Apuk politicians incited attacks against the Aguok, and supplied cattle guards with ammunition and weapons, including Kuac himself, Ambrose Riiny Thiik, the chairman of the Jieng Council of Elders (JCE) and the former chief justice of South Sudan, and Salva Mathok Gengdit, a relative of Kiir and the former deputy minister of the interior.¹⁵ Equally, many high-profile Aguok politicians were involved in supplying weapons to communitarian forces on the ground, including Makiir Gai Thiep, a businessman; Lual Deng Kuel, a member of parliament; and Santino Akot Abiem, the former deputy governor of Gogrial.¹⁶

By the signing of the R-ARCSS in Addis Ababa in September 2018, Warrap state had been scarred by violence that responded to the 28- and 32-state decrees. Elsewhere in South Sudan, these decrees had been intended to maximize the territory under the command of Kiir’s coalition by creating states that followed the de facto lines of military control achieved by the SPLA during the war (Craze, 2022b). In Warrap, by contrast, the creation of new states had set off internecine competitions for administrative power and territory, fuelled by politicians. While many hoped that the end of the South Sudanese civil war would bring such conflict to a close, this proved not to be the case. In Tonj North, one informant said: ‘The war ended, and then everything became war.’¹⁷ ●

“The lack of legitimacy in political appointments in Warrap set the scene for the violence that has marked the state since 2018.”

The R-ARCSS

In February 2020, Kiir decreed that South Sudan would return to ten states, paving the way for the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU).¹⁸ In much of the country, this decree was welcomed. Many communities—largely, but not entirely, non-Dinka—had felt marginalized within a 32-state system that created several mono-ethnic Dinka states, and hoped that a return to a more multi-ethnic set of ten states would improve their condition. In Warrap, however, the move to 28 and then 32 states (and the creation of three states within Warrap: Twic, Gogrial, and Tonj) had generally been received positively. In Tonj and Twic states, the 28-state and then 32-state decrees were largely felt to have improved relations between local communities and the political class. One group of cattle herders in Tonj North, for instance, said that they appreciated the increased contact with politicians afforded by the decrees and that a governor based in Tonj seemed much more responsive to community demands than one based far away in Kuajok.¹⁹

The popularity of these decrees also indicated a limited national compact. The CPA period had created a system in which political positions were understood in narrowly defined sectional terms; a more decentralized system, with an increased number of politicians, proved more amenable to the sectional divisions of Tonj than a larger institutional entity such as Warrap state, which necessitates much more political jockeying between sections and increases the risk of excluding groups by denying them appointments at the state level. The increased fragmentation of state politics created by the state decrees, however, also meant the upgrading of payams to counties in the 28- and 32-state systems. This measure exacerbated border tensions between sections and so, while the 32-state division of the country seemed more politically responsive to sectional loyalties, it also offered far greater opportunities for violent contention.

With the return to ten states, the potential for violence once again increased dramatically, for it is in the transformation of administrative forms, as much as the particular forms themselves, that the potential for violence lies. One of the principal fallouts in Warrap from Kiir's February 2020 decree was the creation of a surplus political class, as governors and state ministers lost their positions, and counties were reclassified as payams. This resulted in a significant number of unemployed commissioners, without an alternative economic engine capable of absorbing all the salaried government employees now in need of employment. According to members of the state government in Warrap, the situation created 'too many politicians for not enough positions', and led to politicians using violence in an effort to unseat incumbents.²⁰

The institutions of customary authority were similarly affected. The upgrading of payams to counties—and, in many cases, the creation of entirely new counties—under the 28- and 32-state decrees led to a proliferation of new chiefs. Customary authority among Nilotic groups in South Sudan is largely a product of colonial administration and local responses to such administration (Kindersley, 2019; Ryle and Amoum, 2018). Since the signing of the CPA, customary authority has been increasingly subsumed within

the government's ambit: customary courts now sit alongside criminal courts, and governors have appointed their own chiefs and dismissed less powerful chiefs if they seem problematic (RVI, 2017). In Warrap, chiefly authority has been diluted by successive waves of government appointments. During the period of the 28- and 32-state decrees, one chief estimated that his area of Tonj went from having five chiefs to 62, many of them government appointees with little legitimacy on the ground.²¹ While venerable chiefs in Tonj possess the legitimacy to resist such a dilution of authority, customary institutions overall have fallen in esteem, and such positions are now largely under the power of the state government.

The proliferation of chiefs under the 28- and 32-state decrees weakened customary authority, created rival centres of power within sections, and increased fractionalization among the sections of Warrap. Many of these chiefs were removed, however, with the return to ten states, which created even more disaffected, rival centres of sectional authority in many parts of Warrap. The move to 32 states (and back again) has therefore left rival, overlapping registers of authority in Warrap at both the political and customary level—multiplying sources of dissatisfaction within the state and fragmenting power at the county level. Many chiefs have managed, through inherited authority and the power of their patronage networks, to escape this dilution of customary authority and retain a great deal of control of the *gelweng*. In general, though, the R-ARCSS period has continued the trend of the last 40 years: customary authority has become increasingly dependent on the military and political elite.

The power-sharing structure

While the SPLA-IO had no presence in Warrap during the South Sudanese civil war, the power-sharing provisions of the R-ARCSS meant that a number of state- and county-level positions went to opposition groups, including the SPLA-IO, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), and the Opposition Political Parties (OPP) coalition. These positions were determined according to a calculus made in Juba; Lakes, for instance, was identified as a target for the SPLA-IO because they believed there would be sufficient discontent with Kiir in the state to allow the opposition to gain a foothold.²² In the end, both Lakes and Warrap were considered too important to be given to the SPLA-IO, and the states were assigned gubernatorial appointees by the government, though the opposition received lesser state appointments within the cabinet.

Some of the more marginal communities in Warrap—least able to speak up at a national level—were assigned SPLA-IO appointees. For instance, Tonj East was given an SPLA-IO commissioner, John Deng Kok Chan. In comparison, Gogrial East was initially proposed as an SPLA-IO county but received an SPLM commissioner following an outcry from the county's powerful political class. The weak position of Tonj East allowed the

surrounding Rek communities to claim Lolith, a grazing area on the border of Luanyjang territory; the identification of Tonj East as the ‘opposition’, and thus enemy territory, enabled other Rek Dinka sections to stake a claim to parts of the county.

The SPLA-IO appointees in Warrap were never meaningfully connected to the actual opposition party under Riek Machar. Instead, the SPLA-IO used the R-ARCSS opportunistically and tried to connect with discontented members of Warrap’s elite—excluded from the extant power structures in the state—and to peel them off from the government. Such appointments included Deng Tong Luach, the commissioner of Twic state, and Victor Wek Koor, the SSOA commissioner for Gogrial West. These alliances were the result of the technocratic imperatives of the peace agreement, rather than a reflection of any substantive party loyalties. Under the R-ARCSS, the SPLA-IO in places such as Warrap has become a contingent vehicle for politicians who are discontented with the government, rather than an organization with any substantive internal unity.

In all cases, the appointments of the R-ARCSS were felt, at both the county and state level, to be less accessible and less representative than previous appointees. Many across Warrap complain that the political class now spends longer in Juba and less time in Warrap state itself. The lack of legitimacy in political appointments in Warrap set the scene for the violence that has marked the state since 2018. ●

“Behind the scenes, the NSS is the substantive political-economic force running much of South Sudan.”

State politics in Warrap, 2018–22

Akol Koor Kuc's rise to power

Kuc has advanced rapidly through the South Sudanese military hierarchy, despite relatively inauspicious beginnings. He is from the small Atok subsection of the Noi (from Tonj North) and, until 2011, served without real distinction in the SPLA, achieving the rank of lieutenant colonel.²³ His father, the head of security for one of the Atok chiefs, recommended him to Kiir in 2011—the year South Sudan gained independence—and the president oversaw Kuc's meteoric rise. Kuc has proved to be an adept political operator, forging alliances with some of the major figures in the military elite of Tonj North—including Anthony Bol Madut (the governor of Warrap from 2006 to 2010 and then the governor of Tonj state from 2018 to 2019) and Magok Achuoth (once the deputy head of South Sudan People's Defence Force (SSPDF) Division 5 in Wau). In common with other members of the military and political elite in South Sudan, Kuc has also built useful alliances through marriage. One of his daughters, for instance, married Matthew Mathiang Magordit (for four hundred cows), shortly before Magordit assumed the governorship of Tonj state in 2019, replacing Anthony Bol Madut.²⁴

Under Kiir's patronage, Kuc was promoted from lieutenant colonel to colonel after only a year, and then to major general a year later, before being appointed the head of the ISB of the NSS in 2013. The South Sudanese civil war that broke out that year came at an opportune time for Kuc. With the SPLA decimated by desertions, Kiir needed a reliable military force to ensure control of the country's oil fields and fight against the SPLA-IO. Kuc was instrumental in funnelling money and materiel directly from Nilepet, the state-owned petroleum company, to Dinka militia forces located around the oil fields of Upper Nile (Craze, 2019; Global Witness, 2018), thanks to his informal seat on the Nilepet board, which he had held since at least 2016, and possibly 2014. The enactment of the NSS Act in 2015 formalized the organization's power, giving it a broad mandate to arrest and detain suspects.²⁵

Under Kuc's leadership, the NSS transformed from an intelligence-gathering agency into one of the most efficient military organizations in the country. The NSS has operated outside the ambit of existing government structures since its establishment, and at least some of its funding has come directly from the Office of the President owing to Kuc's proximity to Kiir. In 2013, for instance, Kuc bypassed established accountability and auditing mechanisms, and used funds from the Office of the President to acquire Israeli ACE rifles, which were then distributed to the Mathiang Anyoor in December 2013 (UNSC, 2016). These transfers are indicative of the NSS's *modus operandi*: though all those involved in the financing of the organization are state actors, its operations depend on a series of private relationships between these actors that are outside of formal state processes.

Kuc and the NSS have also proved a useful counterweight to other military elites within Kiir's coalition. At the beginning of the war, Malong, appointed chief of staff

of the SPLA in 2014, had become one of the central military actors within the government (Boswell, 2019), and his Mathiang Anyoor forces were seen as key to keeping Kiir in power; however, in 2016, Kiir worried that Malong wanted to replace him, with multiple sources reporting that he had travelled to Addis Ababa and Kampala to seek regional support for a coup.²⁶ Kuc refused to support Malong, and instead formed close links with Nhial Deng Nhial—the son of William Deng Nhial, one of the founders of the Anyanya I movement that had fought against Khartoum in Sudan’s first civil war, and widely considered to be Kiir’s eventual successor. When Kiir moved against Malong in 2017, Kuc was instrumental in ensuring that the rebel commander did not return to his homebase of Aweil, where he may have tried to organize his own revolt.²⁷

Malong’s dismissal further empowered Kuc, as Kiir appointed loyalists from Warrap to a series of positions across the government. Although Kiir replaced Malong in Northern Bahr el Ghazal with a mixture of erstwhile Malong allies (such as Santino Deng Wol) and rivals (such as the supporters of Dau Aturjong), elsewhere, he appointed loyalists from Warrap to a series of positions across the government, further empowering Kuc. While in 2011, Kiir’s circle of allies was drawn widely from the Bahr el Ghazal region, at the expense of the Bor Dinka elite who had been close to Garang, since 2017, Kiir’s inner circle of Dinka associates has been increasingly drawn from Warrap state alone—particularly from among the politicians of Gogrial and Tonj North.

The signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018 also strengthened Kuc’s position. A great deal of national and international attention was paid to the chapter two provisions of the peace agreement (Craze, 2020), which in theory would enable a security sector reform (SSR) process that would lead to a unified army. The NSS, however, made it clear that it would not be involved; it would not canton its soldiers or return them to barracks, nor would it vacate civilian areas or unite with the SPLA-IO NSS. The international attention surrounding the SSR process, and the emphasis on the fate of the SPLA/SSPDF, was a fundamental misconception of the military landscape in South Sudan. Since 2013, the army has become less important as a military force in South Sudan; instead, power is now in the hands of ethnically organized militia forces controlled by commanders who have a direct relationship with the Office of the President.²⁸

While the SSR process of the R-ARCSS faltered, the NSS not only refused to withdraw to barracks, but also went on a series of recruitment drives. One such campaign began in September 2018, with the support of customary authorities in Greater Awuul. By August 2019, 10,000 men had been recruited. This force was then trained in Yithkuel, Tonj South. Much of this force was subsequently dispersed around the country, though part of it was mobilized in 2020 to support the Greater Awuul community in their struggles against both the Ajak Leer of Kirrik payam and the SSPDF who backed the Ajak Leer.

The NSS conducted a further recruitment campaign in 2021. Other military forces have also recruited in Bahr el Ghazal since the signing of the R-ARCSS, in violation of the peace agreement's moratorium on military recruitment. Military Intelligence recruited in Lakes state in 2019–20. Also, beginning in October 2018, an entirely new division of the SSPDF, Division 11, was recruited. Division 11 is the brainchild of Santino Deng Wol, the SSDF general who was once an ally of Malong, and who was instrumental in the creation of the Mathiang Anyoor. While in theory Division 11 is part of the SSPDF, it is composed of Dinka from Bahr el Ghazal, answers to the Office of the President, and has not been included in the R-ARCSS process in any meaningful way. Division 11 is effectively a mono-ethnic militia disguised as an army division.

Although Kiir announced the command structure of the Necessary Unified Force in April 2022—seemingly paving the way for a unified South Sudanese army—in reality, the effective fighting forces in South Sudan are no longer contained within the SSPDF hierarchy. Kiir's regime has intensified a process that began after the Juba Declaration in 2006: the creation of military forces, directly under the control of individual commanders, and funded and armed through the Office of the President. The NSS is the largest and most important of these forces.

Little is publicly known about the actual command structure of the NSS. Around the country, NSS intelligence officers form a multi-ethnic force, with personnel often posted outside of their home areas to ensure their fidelity to the organization.²⁹ Most of the higher ranks of the NSS command structure, however, come from Tonj North. The vast majority of its military forces are recruited in Greater Tonj—often, but not exclusively, from the Greater Awuul sections of the Rek Dinka—with the connivance of customary authorities.³⁰ After being recruited and trained in Warrap, these forces are then redeployed across the country. As of 2022, NSS forces, along with Tiger and Commando Divisions, are in control of Juba as well as towns across the Equatorias.

The organizational model for the NSS is the Sudanese intelligence service—once called the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), now renamed the General Intelligence Service (GIS)—which became a parallel government in Sudan in the 1990s, with its own revenue streams and command structures. Just as the NISS was involved in resource extraction in Sudan, the NSS has imbricated itself in the political economy of South Sudan and become involved in mining operations in Wonduruba and Kapoeta, teak logging across the Equatorias, and construction and real estate in Juba, Tonj, and Wau (The Sentry, 2020). In addition, Kuc has expanded the NSS's involvement in oil production and management, effectively running Nilepet as a personal fiefdom since 2021 (UNHRC, 2021). Behind the scenes, the NSS is the substantive political-economic force running much of South Sudan, and its control is unlikely to be affected by either the extension of the R-ARCSS or future elections, given that neither process challenges the material basis for its domination.

The challengers to Kuc

By 2020, Kiir became alarmed at Kuc's growing power—with his construction of an airstrip in Greater Awuul, completed in May of that year, reportedly proving the final straw for Kiir, who sought to limit his protegee's power.³¹ He did so using what has become one of his key tactics: he strengthened Kuc's competitors, thus weakening the head of the NSS, and then reincorporated a weakened Kuc back into his coalition.³²

In June 2020, Kiir dismissed Mayiik Ayii Deng—a Rek Dinka from Tonj North—from the position of Minister of Presidential Affairs, and replaced him with Nhial Deng Nhial, the charismatic former minister of foreign affairs from Tonj South, who was widely considered to be one of the men most likely to succeed Kiir. In August, Kiir appointed Nhial to the board of Nilepet, reportedly to block Kuc's control of the state oil company, and dismissed Kuc from his unofficial position on the same board.³³

The announcement of the state governors in the new R-TGoNU in June 2020 also indicated a changing of the guard. In Lakes state, Kiir appointed Makur Kulang Liei, from the Luach section of the Atuot, and a close ally of his kinsman, Rin Tueny 'Janafil' Mabor, then director of Military Intelligence. Mabor, the former governor of Eastern Lakes state, had been appointed as director of Military Intelligence in February 2019, and had spent much of that year mobilizing militia forces in Lakes, diverting SSPDF supplies to those forces. Just as Kiir had built up Kuc's NSS as a counterweight to Malong's Mathiang Anyoor, he then enabled Mabor to build up his own force to counterbalance Kuc.

Simultaneously, Kiir surprisingly appointed Bona Panek as the governor of Warrap state. Panek had been the governor of Twic state from 2015 to 2017, before being relieved by Kiir following Panek's unpopular decision to move the state capital from Turalei to Mayen Abun. After his time as governor, Panek served as deputy director of Military Intelligence under Mabor, becoming close to his superior. Panek's appointment as governor of Warrap was widely understood to serve as a counterweight to Kuc's authority. Kiir therefore moved to counterbalance Kuc in a variety of ways: his political support to Nhial at the national level was accompanied by the appointment of figures loyal to Mabor as state governors in Lakes and Warrap.

Disarmament in Tonj East

Having blocked Kuc politically in the first half of 2020, his rivals, empowered by Kiir, moved against him militarily. Panek announced a disarmament campaign in Warrap state. During the CPA period, disarmament campaigns had been used by governors as a means to disempower the military forces of rivals seeking state power, with collected weapons often being redistributed to allies rather than destroyed (Brethfeld,

2010; Craze, 2020, p. 31; Rands, 2010, p. 42; Stone, 2011, p. 7). The 2020 disarmament campaign in Warrap would continue that trend. The campaign began in Tonj East, the home of Magordit, the previous governor of Tonj state and a Kuc ally (as well as the husband of one of his daughters). Kuc's NSS had previously recruited men in Tonj East and distributed weapons to the Luanyjang Dinka of the area. At a national level, it was widely understood that the disarmament campaign would enable Mabor and Panek to move against Kuc's allies.

Mabor also arrested more than 20 chiefs from Tonj South, ostensibly on the grounds that they had failed to register firearms, but in reality because of their support for Kuc. Three battalions were also deployed to Tonj North; they supported sections from Greater Akop against the Greater Kuanythii sections to which Kuc belongs during clashes in which the NSS and the SSPDF sponsored opposing sides, providing them with materiel, food, and water.³⁴ Political tensions at the national level were transposed onto inter-sectional clashes within the Rek Dinka—intensifying existing conflicts.

Bol Akot Bol led the disarmament campaign in Tonj East. A Rek Dinka major general, Bol Akot had been instrumental in the recruitment and organization of *gelweng* forces in Warrap during the second civil war, and had subsequently been close to both Mabor and Kiir; he took a leading role in events in Juba in December 2013, as a commander of one of the city's four sections (AU, 2014, p. 140). In late July 2020, Bol Akot established a command post in Romic, the county capital of Tonj East, and prepared to begin the disarmament campaign.

Despite the importance of national political dynamics, the dynamics of disarmament cannot be reduced to the struggle between Kuc and Mabor. The Luanyjang of Tonj East understood the disarmament campaign in terms of historical patterns of injustice and inequality. The Luanyjang are a demographic minority in Warrap, and aware that they are outnumbered by the Rek Dinka sections on their western border, many of which—often under the command of Anthony Bol Madut, the former governor of Tonj—had raided the Luanyjang during the second Sudanese civil war. This sense of inequality has been heightened over the last ten years. While few parts of Greater Tonj saw much in the way of development, Kuc's influence meant that it had at least benefited from the construction of some schools and health facilities, as had Tonj South—once the capital of Tonj state. In Tonj East, people are extremely conscious of this unequal history of development, frequently citing the presence of a hospital at Marial Lou, in the area of the Lou Paher subsection of Greater Akop, and the absence of an equivalent health facility in Tonj East. The disarmament campaign was seen in Tonj East as only the latest in a long run of unequal treatments meted out to the Luanyjang.

The campaign also came at a critical political moment. With the return to ten states, Rek Dinka sections from the Greater Ananatak had laid claim to grazing areas on the border between Tonj North and Tonj East, such as Lolith, and felt emboldened to take them—partly because Tonj East had been assigned an SPLA-IO county commissioner

who was marginal and ineffective in state-level politics. The Luanyjang feared that disarmament would leave them unable to defend themselves against the Ananatak sections. Without parallel disarmament campaigns in Mayendit county in Unity and among the Gok and Agar Dinka in Lakes, the Luanyjang were also concerned that giving up their guns would leave them vulnerable to raids from their neighbours.

Tensions between the Luanyjang *gelweng* and the disarmament force increased throughout July 2020 and exploded into violence on 8 August 2020, after the SSPDF shot an unarmed man in the market in Romic. In the ensuing clashes, the SSPDF used tanks and heavy artillery to attack cattle camps, while the military base in Romic was overrun by the *gelweng*. The clashes left 63 soldiers and 85 civilians dead, in what was widely perceived as an embarrassing loss for Bol Akot and Mabor. During these clashes, the *gelweng* operated and made decisions independently of either the county commissioner or the Luanyjang customary authorities; in the face of a hostile state force—bent on punishing the Luanyjang for the power of Kuc—the *gelweng* became the force on the ground in Tonj East with popular legitimacy.

The challengers defeated

Bol Akot and Mabor's disarmament campaign in Greater Tonj was met with public opprobrium, given the widespread use of extrajudicial killings, the imprisonment of chiefs in Tonj South, and its failure to disarm the Luanyjang. The loss forced Bol Akot to quit Tonj East—abandoning several tanks in Romic—though he remained in Tonj South until mid-2021 and, for two months following clashes in August 2020, prevented humanitarian organizations from accessing Tonj East, effectively creating a siege of the county. The embarrassment of the disarmament campaign, and Panek's failure to quell violence in Greater Tonj, led Kiir to shift strategies. Panek was fired in January 2021 and replaced with an experienced Noi politician from Tonj North, Aleu, who quickly forged a close bond with his kinsman from Greater Awuul, Kuc. Mabor was removed from his position as head of Military Intelligence and appointed governor of Lakes in June 2021, replacing Liei, who had also failed to reduce violence in the state during his term as governor.³⁵

The political challenge to Kuc was also unsuccessful. Nhial's campaign to gain support in Warrap proved maladroit. While Nhial had been a successful minister of foreign affairs, and was respected in Warrap as a statesman and an orator, he had never served as a military commander, had no military forces, and found himself isolated in a state full of Kuc loyalists. In response, he attempted to resurrect the SPLM party machinery. Prior to the South Sudanese civil war, it was the party that had prevented Juba from exerting too much influence on state-level politics. During the war, it was increasingly bypassed by Kiir and Kuc, who made direct appointments to administrative positions,

striking up unmediated relationships with other politicians, outside the aegis of the party. As one politician in Warrap explained:

During the time of the 32 states, the SPLM got lost completely. There was no democracy at the state level. In Warrap, the director [Kuc] was so powerful, he controlled appointments right down to county administrations. That is why people had to listen to these military leaders, at every level. And he [Nhial] wanted to stop this excessive use of power, and give power back to the SPLM.³⁶

Nhial's attempt to reconstruct the party machinery, however, foundered due to the technocratic imperatives of the R-ARCSS, which gave all decision-making power to Juba. To make matters worse, by January 2021, Kiir had grown concerned that Nhial would mount a bid for the presidency with the support of the Bor Dinka political elite, who have long felt marginalized by the dominance of the Warrap-based politicians close to the president. On 31 January, the JCE, an influential lobby group, released a statement endorsing calls for Kiir and Machar to step aside. Daniel Awet Akot, the former presidential minister for military affairs, echoed this call in March 2021 and explicitly called for Nhial to take over. While Nhial had political backers in Juba and enjoyed widespread popularity in Warrap, he had failed to build the kind of substantive military and economic base on the ground that would enable him to pose a threat to Kiir's regime and a month later, he was gone. On 11 April 2021, he was dismissed as minister for presidential affairs—to be replaced by the Lou Nuer loyalist Barnaba Marial Benjamin—and, shortly thereafter, removed from the board of Nilepet. On the same day, Kuc was finally officially appointed to the board of Nilepet and promoted to the position of lieutenant general.

It is unlikely that this game of musical chairs is part of a grand strategy on Kiir's part. It is rather more parsimonious to suppose that these moves are tactical, rather than strategic, and made in order to confront, and overcome, a constantly changing set of challengers to his reign. Retrospectively, one can see a logic to these tactical manoeuvres. Nhial represented a genuine challenge to Kiir's presidency, as he had the necessary skill set for the position (such as command of the necessary languages—English and Arabic—and oratory skills). By offering Nhial a chance to wield power, Kiir exposed him as being ill-equipped to deal with the reality of South Sudanese politics. Nhial has now effectively retired.

Kuc presented a different problem. While he does not pose a significant threat to the president—a position for which he has neither the skills nor the inclination—his NSS constitutes a material and military regime that is potentially independent of Kiir's control and that needed to be disciplined rather than destroyed. The disarmament campaign and the strengthening of Mabor did precisely that. Kuc then returned to the fold, suitably chastened.

The governorship of Aleu Ayieny Aleu

It is striking that while Aleu and Mabor are rivals, their recipe for gubernatorial success was very similar. Both men waged military campaigns as governors in two states that, since the signing of the R-ARCSS, have effectively been war zones. Immediately after assuming office, Aleu went on a ‘peace tour’ of Warrap. The tour was designed to stamp his authority on the state, but left bodies in its wake. In March 2021, his forces executed a man suspected of murder over a dowry dispute in Romic, Tonj East and, on 11 April, his bodyguards executed five men in Pagol payam that they had detained due to a recent ambush. These executions were part of his ‘law and order’ campaign, intended to assert his monopoly of violence in the state. Much of Warrap, however, felt these actions indicated the degree to which the state itself is beyond the law and incapable of being sanctioned.

The executions intensified tensions between communities. On 7 April, clashes emerged in Pagol payam between the communities of Kirrik (Leek Ajak section) and Pagol (Nyang Akoc subsection); the ambush on a vehicle travelling to Tonj South, which resulted in the arrest of the men who were subsequently executed, was in response to these clashes.³⁷ Aleu detained the five men by calling the chief of the Pagol and threatening him with death unless he handed over those involved in the ambush. The men’s execution caused great disquiet among the people of Pagol, who felt they had been targeted by the state on the basis of their sectional identity, especially as they alleged that some of the executed men were innocent.

Pagol’s reaction indicates a further problem with Aleu’s campaign of extrajudicial killings; rather than end violence in the state, the campaign provoked it, as Aleu took sides in conflicts between sections, and so created the sort of politicization of sectional rivalry that underlay some of the worst violence of the disarmament campaign of 2020. Aleu’s partisanship was evident shortly after he arrived in Kuajok on 27 February, when the NSS were deployed, on his orders, to protect Greater Awuul and Warrap town, but not other communities in Tonj North that had experienced clashes, including the Awan Parek and the Ajak Leer of Kirrik and Rualbet payams, respectively—both sections that had clashed with the Noi and Atok communities in Tonj North. The perception of Aleu’s governorship as partisan was further demonstrated on 9 March, when the Ajak Leer gelang raided Warrap town as the governor held a meeting.

Recruitment continued in Warrap throughout 2021–22. The newly formed Division 11 recruited soldiers, including minors, partly in Tonj North, where Kuc’s NSS also continued recruiting. In addition, Aleu conscripted a battalion, called ‘Tuek Tuek’, that is nominally associated with Division 11, but that was created in imitation of Malong’s Mathiang Anyoor. At a rally held in March 2021 for the new recruits, Aleu warned them that they would not receive a salary and would have to support themselves, as they did during the second civil war. The creation of these semi-formalized militias,

without wages, produces a situation of necessary predation, as such forces have to loot and raid in order to survive. Aleu, wary of Bol Akot's example, further warned his recruits that being defeated by the *gelweng*, as had happened the previous year, would not be tolerated. Paradoxically, however, it should be noted that the creation of these militias, partly designed to repress the *gelweng*, also empowers them. Without access to wages, but with a plentiful supply of ammunition and weapons, many soldiers end up selling their weapons to the *gelweng* to meet their basic needs, aware that they can always receive more armaments by signing up to another military force.

Aleu's third strategy, alongside his law-and-order campaign and the recruitment of militias, was the taming of chiefly authority. On the peace tour that began his governorship, Aleu detained many chiefs from Greater Kuanythii.³⁸ They were subsequently released, but many complained of being intimidated by the government or threatened with dismissal. As one chief explained:

One of the things that has led to a loss of our power is that today there are many more chiefs than before, and any government official who comes, if they see that a Paramount Chief or any other chief is not cooperating with them, then they just dismiss them and appoint another one, or if the chief is too old and powerful to be dismissed, then the government works with another one. You see, we have so many chiefs: those that represented the people in Khartoum and have now returned, those appointed during the time of the 32 states. . . . So the government works to sideline chiefs it doesn't agree with, and identify those who will do what it tells them.³⁹

As the next section of this Report demonstrates, Aleu was not significantly more successful in imposing himself on Warrap state than Panek before him. The limits of his approach are clear: firstly, the state government has almost no political legitimacy, given that it was not elected and its representatives were determined by the government in Juba; secondly, his campaign to restore law and order was carried out through extrajudicial killings, and by suspending the law for those most in need of judicial sanction—the military; and thirdly, his interventions in the state, through recruitment and military deployments, were considered politically partisan rather than neutral, and part of his backing for the Noi in particular and Greater Kuanythii in general.

An incident in 2022 highlights the limits of Aleu's approach. In June, a raid into the Kongor section in Aliek payam by the Awan Parek section of Rualbet led to the theft of 125 livestock. Division 11 intervened, under the command of Santino Kuot Kuotdit, and the youth of Awan Parek responded, killing 65 soldiers, including 32 high-ranking members of Division 11. For the youth of Awan Parek, Division 11's pursuit of the stolen livestock was not an intervention by a neutral police force to return property to its rightful owners, but the encroachment of paramilitary forces whose loyalties are to their particular commanders and their sectional identities.

Aleu's governorship, like Panek's before it, failed to bring an end to violence in Warrap state. The second half of 2022 saw Aleu's forces use increasingly violent repression against the civilians of Warrap, including the razing of a Seventh Day Adventist Church in Gogrial East in October 2022, and clashes in Rualbet payam between Division 11 and the Awan Parek that followed the fighting in June outlined above. In November 2022, Division 11 went from village to village in Rualbet, harassing civilians and sexually abusing women, leading to large-scale displacements to Warrap town and Marial Lou. Tensions between the Awan Parek and the Noi threatened to erupt into a more general conflagration in Tonj North, and indicated the failure of Aleu's governorship. Rather than intervene to prevent inter-sectional conflict, his forces had taken sides in hostilities. Aleu rapidly lost legitimacy in the state and also fell out with Kuc, the kingmaker of Warrap. On 16 November 2022, Kiir dismissed Aleu, replacing him with Manhiem Bol Malek, the former deputy governor of Tonj state and a storied military commander. He is the son of Bol Malek, the Paramount Chief of the Luachkoth—part of the Greater Ananatak sections of Tonj East. Although he is reportedly very close to Kuc, it remains likely that he, just like his predecessors, will be unable to prevent violence in Warrap state. ●



The territorial and administrative logic of Dinka sections in Warrap has become a state-based logic, predicated on the absolute control of territory.”

Violence in Tonj

Since the signing of the R-ARCSS, Greater Tonj has been the epicentre of violence in Warrap state. Fighting occurred throughout 2020 and 2021, and continued into 2022, in Makuac and Paliang payams in Tonj East, Alabek and Pagol payams in Tonj North, and in Thiet in Tonj South. For reasons of space, this Report does not attempt to reconstruct each clash. Instead, the synthetic accounts of conflict in Greater Tonj given below will sketch out the principal fault lines between communities, and the underlying reasons for the violence.

Tonj North

There are three forms of conflict in Tonj North: that which occurs between the sections of Greater Akop and Greater Kuanythii; that which occurs within these broader sections; and that which occurs with neighbouring communities in Tonj East, Lakes, and Unity states.⁴⁰ It is important to note that these distinctions are overly simplified; on occasion, subsections within Greater Kuanythii temporarily join forces with those of Greater Akop—as in 2021, when the Ajak Leer attacked the Atok and Noi, and joined forces with sections from Greater Akop. Such alliances, however, tend to be temporary and respond to broader macro-political shifts, rather than representing substantive alliances. On the borders of Tonj North, there have been three conflicts that have involved neighbouring counties and states.

Clashes with neighbouring counties and states

Since the signing of the R-ARCSS, the Bul Nuer and the Rek Dinka of Aliek, Alabek, Akop, and Marial Lou payams in Tonj North have raided one another. This raiding occurs during the dry season, as grazing routes intersect and both Dinka and Nuer compete for access to the same land. In Mayom, significant pressure to stop raiding has been placed on Bul Nuer youth by the then county commissioner Manime Gatluak—the brother of Kiir’s influential adviser, Tut Kew Gatluak.⁴¹ While the Bahr el Ghazal elite close to Kiir would like the Nuer raiding to stop, Manime Gatluak’s efforts were less than successful. The period 2021–22 saw clashes between his bodyguards and Bul Nuer cattle guards, especially those connected to Gai Machiek, an influential Bul Nuer prophet.

Both Bul Nuer and Renk Dinka cattle guards have been armed by military actors. In Mayom, many of the cattle guards are working for the very politicians that, at least formally, call for raiding to be restrained. In 2022, incidents included a Bul Nuer raid on Gogrial East in April, and an attack in Twic county on a Unity state government convoy heading to Mayom in May, which led Mayom youth to organize an attack on Twic county that required the intervention of Tut Kew Gatluak to be halted. Fundamentally, the

Table 1 Dinka sections and other ethnic groups in Warrap state

Twic county				
Twic Dinka				
Section	Subsection(s)	Primary area of habitation	Migration route(s) ^a	Prominent members
Twic Dinka	Adiang	Wunrok payam	North to near the Kiir River, on the border with Abyei	Lieutenant General Garang Mabil, SSPDF commander; Lieutenant General Chol Mabil, SSPDF commander and brother to Garang Mabil; Majak Aleer, member of parliament
	Akuar	Aweng payam	North to near the Kiir River	Kuany Mayom Deng, member of parliament; Jacob Madhel Lang Juuk, paramount chief and former governor of Twic state
	Amiol	Turalei payam	North to near the Kiir River, on the border with Abyei	Nyangdeng Maleng, member of the national parliament and former governor of Warrap state; Mangok Gum, member of parliament
	Chobok/Mabok	Panyok payam	To the Apuk toic ^b in Gogrial East	General Kon Mayniel, SSPDF military commander and former governor of Twic state
	Kuac	Ajakuac payam	North to near the Kiir River	Bona Malual, politician and former Sudanese Minister of State for Information and Culture
	Thon	Akoc payam	North to near the Kiir River, on the border with Abyei	Bona Panek Biar, former governor of Warrap state

Gogrial West county

Aguok, Awan, and Kuac

Section	Subsection(s)	Primary area of habitation	Migration route(s)	Prominent members
Aguok	Agurpiny, Ajak, Atutkuel, Buothanyith, Marial, Monydit, Ngokabayen, Ngokayaric, Ngokkuec, Pakalagep, Pakallol, and Wuny	Alek, Mayomtotin, Atukuel, and Gogrial payams	To Apuk areas in Gogrial East (Ngokabayen, Ngokayaric, and Ngokkuec sections); to Alel in Western Bahr el Ghazal (Monydit and Atukuel sections); to the Lou toic in Tonj North (Buothanyith, Agurpiny, and Wuny sections); north to the Kiir River on the border between Twic county and the Ngok Dinka in Abyei (Pakalagep and Pakallol sections)	Makiir Gai Thiep, businessman (Alek payam); Lual Deng Kuel, member of parliament (Alek payam); Santino Akot Abiem, former deputy governor of Gogrial (Gogrial payam); Achiech Kuot, a director of the National Security Service (Gogrial payam); Honourable Toor Deng Maiwen, member of the national parliament and former governor of Warrap state (Atukuel payam)
Awan	Awan Chan and Awan Mou	Awan Chan (Akon North and Akon South payams); Awan Mou (Rieu payam)	To Apuk toic and into areas of Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Salva Kiir, South Sudanese President; Bona Bang Dhel, SSPDF general
Kuac	N/A ^c	Kuac North, Kuac South, Angui and Malek payams	To Apuk toic and to Alel in Western Bahr el Ghazal	Agaak Achuil Lual, former minister of finance; Lual Achuil Lual, member of the national parliament

Gogrial East county				
Apuk Dinka				
Section	Subsection(s)	Primary area of habitation	Migration route(s)	Prominent members
Apuk Dinka	Abior, Abuok Nyarmong, Adoor, Amuk, Apol, Biong, Buoyar, and Jurmananger	Gogrial East county	To Apuk toic	Abraham Gum Makuac, commander of SSPDF Division 4 (Jurmananger subsection); Gregory Deng Kuac, a director of the National Security Service and brother-in-law of President Kiir (Abuok subsection); Ambrose Riiny Thiik, chairman of the JCE (Amuk subsection); Salva Mathok Gengdit, relative of the president and former deputy minister of the interior (Abuok subsection)
Tonj North county				
Greater Akop and Greater Kuachthii				
Section	Subsection(s)	Primary area of habitation	Migration route(s)	Prominent members
Greater Akop	Apuk Padoc	Akop payam	To Akop toic and Mashara toic, which is contested with the Lou Paher	General Bol Madut, former governor of Warrap; Peter Paduol, SPLA-IO member in Warrap state
	Awan Parek	Rualbet payam	To Toic Akop, Lou Mawien toic, and Apuk toic	Ustaz Lewis Anei, former governor of Warrap; Augustino Maduot Parek, former director of Immigration, Nationality, and Passports
	Kongor	Aliek payam	To Kongor toic, Lou Mawien toic, and Apuk Giir toic	Kongor Arop, former governor of Bahr el Ghazal; Machar Achiek Ader, former managing director of Nilepet; Peter Kuol Fidel Majok Mabior Gak, businessman

	Lou Mawien	Alabek payam	To Lou Mawien toic	Mawien Dhor Ariik, paramount chief; Mawien Mawien, NSS Commander
	Lou Paher	Marial Lou payam	To Mashara toic, which is contested with the Apuk Padoc	Professor Anei Mangong Anei; Malook Lual, former state minister of local government
Greater Kuachthii	Abiem Mayar	Manloor payam	To Western Bahr el Ghazal	Yel Mayar Mareng, former deputy governor of Warrap state
	Ajak Leer	Kirrik payam	To Lou Mawien toic and Akuoc toic	Arol Gakdit Bol, paramount chief; Deng Mayom Akeen (former member of parliament)
	Atok	Awuul payam	N/A	Akol Kor Kuc, director of the Internal Security Bureau of the National Security Service; Maruop Riing Muorwel, businessman
	Noi	Warrap payam	To Lou Mawien toic and Alel in Western Bahr el Ghazal	Aleu Ayieny Aleu, former governor of Warrap state; Deng Ayieny, former commissioner of Tonj North
	Nyang Akoc	Pagol payam	To Alel in Western Bahr el Ghazal	Achuol Akoc Magar, member of parliament
Tonj East county				
Greater Ananatak and Luanyjang				
Section	Subsection(s)	Primary area of habitation	Migration route(s)	Prominent members
Greater Ananatak	Akook	Ananatak payam	To Manyangok toic in Tonj South	Awut Deng Achuil, member of parliament, minister of general education, and daughter of the paramount chief
	Aliap	Ngabagok payam	To Manyangok toic and—conflict permitting—to Luanyjang toic	No data

	Jalwau, which contains the following further subsections: Adoor (Mayen Adar boma), Bac (Ager boma), Konggor (Walang boma), Pakoor (Pagak boma)	Wunlit payam	To Manyangok toic and— conflict permitting—to Luanyjang toic	Gum Mading Akuecbeny Cirong, paramount chief
	Luachkoth	Palal payam	To Manyangok toic, and also to Western Bahr el Ghazal, near Kuajiena and Mapel	Manheim Bol Malek, current governor of Warrap state
	Thiik	Malualcum payam	To Manyangok toic	SSPDF General Ker Kiiir Ker; Ajook Makom Ajook, associated with the Office of the President
Luanyjang	Nyangrup, which contains the following further subsections: Arieu (Klunkuel boma), Bar (Klunchuei boma), Kongor (Madol boma), and Pakom (Abior boma)	Paliang payam	Most of the Luanyjang sections migrate into Luanyjang toic	General Matthew Magoordit, former governor of Tonj state
	Chierrup, which contains the following further subsections: Abuong (Juolgok payam), Lian (Kuelchuk payam), and Pariak (Pannhial payam)	Paweng payam	See above	No data
	Nyangwiir, which contains the following further subsections: Akokluac (Ayook boma), Klunadel	Makuach payam	See above	No data

	(Wunnyeth boma), Klunthuc (Mapara boma), Nyarnhom (Cuiealek boma)			
	Chiertoc, which contains the following further subsections: Atek (Piotakou boma), Athor (Midher boma), Kuok (Pagor boma)	Pagor payam	See above	No data
Tonj South county				
Atuot, Bongo, and Rek Dinka				
Section	Subsection(s)	Primary area of habitation	Migration route(s)	Prominent members
Atuot	N/A	Tonj town	N/A	No data
Bongo	N/A	Tonj town and Agoga payam	N/A	No data
Rek Dinka	Apuk Juwiir	Thiet payam	To Manyangok and into Western Bahr el Ghazal	Deng Chirillo, proposed commissioner for Tonj South
	Muoc	Tonj South payam	No data	No data
	Thony	Manyangok payam	No data	Nhial Deng Nhial, former chairperson of Nilepet, former Minister of Presidential Affairs
	Yar	Wathalel payam	To Manyangok	Juma Abou, SSPDF commander

Notes: ^a 'Migration routes' always refers to dry season passage to pastoralist grazing sites. ^b A reference to the 'Apuk toic' is a reference to the dry season grazing areas of a given group (the Apuk, or the Lou, in the phrase, 'Lou toic'.) A 'toic' is an area of land inundated by water during the rainy season, whether from river over-flow or rains, that retains sufficient moisture to be dry season grazing areas. ^c N/A indicates not applicable. For example, the Kuac are not further divided into subsections; the Atuot do not carry out a dry season migration and so no dry season migration routes are given, etc.

interests of the conjoined Bul Nuer–Rek Dinka political class focus on maintaining an orderly border between Warrap and Unity, and keeping together the government coalition, even if some members of the class also benefit from the raiding. The cattle guards, however, do not share this commitment to a broader political compact. The war, and the elite agreement produced by it, has done little for the immiserated population of either state. As a result, for the cattle guards, the short-term goals of acquiring livestock, maintaining access to grazing pastures, and exacting revenge for those killed trump the concerns of the political class—which is itself often divided and capable of backing raids in order to destabilize rivals.

Clashes involving migration to the Jur River area

The Rek Dinka of Tonj North who migrate into the Jur River area of Western Bahr el Ghazal (particularly from the Abiem Mayar and Nyang Akoc subsections) participated in clashes in 2019 that quickly took on a political nature, as the border between the two states corresponded to the border between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO. These clashes also testify to the changing dynamics between Warrap and Western Bahr el Ghazal. Since the signing of the CPA, larger livestock herds have been entering the Jur River, often earlier in the year, before the end of the planting season, and causing significant disruption to Luo agriculturalists. The gelweng who do enter the Jur River are often backed by Warrap-based politicians—whose herds they are guarding—and the resulting clashes with agriculturalists quickly take on political significance. Prior grazing agreements, such as the Marial Bai agreement, first agreed in 2016 and frequently renegotiated, tend to fall prey to several obstacles.

Firstly, while the agreements commit pastoralists to travel without weapons in Western Bahr el Ghazal, few cattle herders—let alone the owners of the herds—feel that security conditions are stable enough for that to occur.

Secondly, the meetings that do take place to negotiate future dry season grazing do not include the necessary participants. All the customary chiefs for the groups that migrate into Western Bahr el Ghazal were invited to the pre-negotiation meeting for the 2021–22 grazing season in Kuajok, held in November 2021, but none of the heads of the cattle camps, who actually determine events on the ground during the migration.⁴² The invited chiefs were all loyal to the government, and unlikely to be able to prevent conflict on the ground. A common complaint during the meeting was that, when cattle are taken or lost in Western Bahr el Ghazal, the cattle herders are not allowed into SPLA-IO areas to look for them; however, SPLA-IO figures are excluded from the final negotiations over grazing. While the government and the customary authorities of both groups are seen as key to developing such agreements, it is the cattle herders and military forces that actually enable or prevent the migration on the ground and must participate in such meetings if migrations into the Jur River are to pass without violence.

Thirdly, the political dynamics in Warrap and Western Bahr el Ghazal states have become a part of grazing dynamics; given the vicissitudes of war, the social compact between the two sides has been sufficiently degraded that Jur River Luo chiefs reported having no interest in Dinka grazing in their areas at all.⁴³ In other words, the encroachment of powerful militarized cattle herders on their land has led to the rhetorical abandonment of the sort of shared sense of existence that would be necessary for Dinka grazing to take place in the Jur River area.

Clashes between the Lou Paher North and the Luanyjang

Finally, clashes have occurred between the Lou Paher in Marial Lou payam in Tonj North and the Luanyjang of Tonj East. These clashes form part of a larger struggle, analysed below, between the Rek Dinka and the Luanyjang, which took on extreme forms in 2021 and saw the Luanyjang assault Marial Lou not to acquire livestock, but in order to destroy the Lou Paher. The shifting form of the conflict partly explains why a framework that emphasizes rising bridewealth costs as a principal motor for violence in Warrap is misplaced. Over the last few years, inter-sectional conflict has become a form of absolute conflict, in which the destruction of community property and assets is prioritized over cattle raiding. Attacks are intended to prevent opposing communities from sustaining life. Luanyjang attacks on Marial Lou in 2021 resulted in the destruction of hundreds of properties, the looting of World Food Programme warehouses, and the ransacking of a health clinic—a facility cited by the Luanyjang as an example of the politicized and unequal development that has seen Tonj East underdeveloped relative to Tonj North. The logic of this violence cannot be understood in terms of bridewealth costs.

Conflict dynamics in Tonj North

Most conflict in Tonj North, however, has been internal to the county. In 2020–21, extensive clashes took place between Greater Awuul (the Kuanythii subsections from the west of Tonj North—Abiem Mayar, Ajak Leer, Atok, Noi, and Nyang Akoc) and the sections of Greater Akop (Apuk Padoic, Awan Parek, Juer, Kongor, and Lou Paher), from the eastern part of Tonj North. The dynamics of these clashes are partly determined by the intercession of political and military elites, and complicated by the fact that parts of the Ajak Leer joined the sections from Greater Akop during some of these clashes.⁴⁴ In February and March 2021, just as Aleu was making his peace tour in Tonj North, clashes occurred again between Greater Awuul and Greater Akop—with over 3,000 tukuls burned down—and continued intermittently throughout the year. By November 2021, the entire Atok and Noi populations had largely been displaced to the centre of Greater Awuul, or fled to Gogrial, Tonj South, or Warrap town. Both sides

reported that the NSS and the SSPDF were involved in the clashes, and extensive NSS defensive positions were observed around Greater Awuul in November 2021.⁴⁵

The narratives that locals give for such clashes suggest that the triggers for violence can be comparatively small, but—insofar as they index historical grievances and perceptions of unequal treatment—such sparks can quickly ignite zero-sum conflict. Recent conflict between the Apuk Padoic and the Atok and Noi sections, for instance, is often attributed to an incident that occurred in 2018, when an Atok man was killed while driving in Apuk Padoic areas. The Atok and Noi responded by setting up a checkpoint to search for the culprit. The Apuk Padoic interpreted this as a claim over border areas between the two groups, and as a further play for Atok and Noi dominance of Tonj North, particularly since the checkpoint was established during a large-scale NSS recruitment campaign in Greater Awuul. This triggered conflict between the two groups, as the Apuk Padoic moved to maintain their territory. As one international observer noted, given this heightened level of suspicion between communities, it is the *perception* of hostile activity that often leads to clashes—insofar as those perceptions are based on a legitimate belief that certain groups are politically and militarily backed by parts of the South Sudanese state, and are attempting to dominate the administrative and territorial politics of the area.⁴⁶

These clashes are not simply driven by perception, however. From 2020 to 2022, the Ajak Leer have clashed with not only the Atok and the Noi, but also other sections from nearby payams, due to contestations over *toic* (grazing areas) on the border between Awul, Kirrik, Manloor, and Pagol payams. Such contentions over *toic* also provoked clashes in 2021 within the sections of Greater Akop, including between Apuk Padoic and Awan Parek, on one side, and the Lou Paher, on the other. The emergence of serious clashes between the Lou Paher and the Luanyjang, as noted above, has changed that dynamic; the clashes with the Luanyjang are more intense than intra-Rek clashes and have therefore led to a reconciliation between Rek sections.⁴⁷

Fundamentally, clashes in Tonj North are not resource-based; absolute scarcity of *toic* or grazing land is rarely at issue. Nor can such clashes be understood as being about the acquisition of livestock, although this is a precipitating factor for some raids. The absolute devastation wrought in Greater Awuul and Marial Lou instead represents attacks on communities, designed to prevent their capacity to sustain life. These clashes are so devastating because the fundamental logic of governmental war has largely—albeit not entirely—replaced the moral codes that determined intra-sectional fighting until only very recently. Claims to *toic*—or to territory, as in the case of the Apuk Padoic and Atok clashes mentioned above—are understood to be absolute claims, designed to arrogate a given resource or territory to one group or another.

The instrumentalization of inter-sectional identitarian claims to land, resources, and positions has also transformed the mechanism of revenge. Revenge was previously a limit to violence: violent retaliation had to be proportionate to the initial act, and

thus enable forms of mediation—such as the repayment of cattle or the payment of compensation for lives lost. Since 2018, attacks are made against entire communities, and cycles of revenge mean that the aggrieved communities respond reciprocally. Such attacks no longer weigh a delicate material balance of interests in which the gains of an attack are evaluated against the payment of compensation and the risk of further violence; instead, they are determined by a political calculus that sets sections against each other in maximal competition for resources, territory, and the very possibility of existence.

Tonj East

Tonj East is divided into two principal groups: the Luanyjang groups in the north-east of the county and the Rek groups, collectively known as Greater Ananatak, in the south-west.⁴⁸ As in Tonj North, the area experiences three forms of external conflict.

Clashes between the Haak Nuer and the Luanyjang

The Luanyjang have historically clashed with the Haak Nuer of Mayendit, in Unity—especially as, during the dry season, both sides move towards the toic areas in the border region in search of pasture. Flooding in 2020 led to a reduction in clashes between the groups.

Clashes with Agar Dinka and Gok

Despite flooding, clashes with Gok and Agar Dinka in Lakes have continued, with forces from the Pakam subsection of the Agar Dinka attacking Luanyjang villages in 2021. Tensions along the inter-state borders of Tonj East with both Lakes and Unity have meant that the Luanyjang are increasingly trapped within their own territory, a situation exacerbated by the flooding of 2020.

Clashes between the Luanyjang and the Greater Ananatak

Following the failed disarmament process of August 2020, the Luanyjang gelweng and their herds pushed into the north-eastern part of Tonj East in search of pasture, given that flooding had blocked some of their more traditional routes. This situation heightened tensions with the Greater Ananatak groups and, by 6 October 2020, violence had erupted between the two sides and quickly spread. The existential stakes of this conflict make the zero-sum calculations of Tonj North easier to understand. The

Greater Ananatak groups not only continued to attack the Luanyjang, but also joined some of the Rek Dinka sections of Tonj North—Apuk Padoic and Lou Paher—in mounting a siege of Luanyjang areas. All the major supply routes into the Luanyjang communities were blocked, and humanitarian aid intended for the community was stopped and looted. The Luanyjang found themselves encircled. This partly explains the intensification of Luanyjang raids on Kachuat, Marial Lou, and Ngabagok, among other locations, in February–March 2020, in order to obtain food and livestock. In March 2020, the Lou Paher attacked the toic at the contested border point of Lolith, between the Luanyjang in Paliang and the Rek in Kacuat. These attacks came just as the SPLA-IO commissioner for Tonj East was announced, and were designed to arrogate control of the contested border area to the Rek.

For the Luanyjang, the consequences of the clashes have been devastating, with food supplies running low and livestock forced into areas that leave them vulnerable to raids from Mayendit and livestock diseases. The situation has also compounded the group’s sense of marginalization at the state and national levels. Clashes between the Rek Dinka and the Luanyjang continued in February and March 2022. While fighting had, at the time of writing, ceased, none of the major systematic grievances between the two sides have been addressed.

Tonj South

Tonj South consists of both a minority Bongo population, resident in the southernmost part of the county, and a series of Rek Dinka sections.⁴⁹ Many of these sections move into the Jur River during the dry season and, in 2020–21, tension between the Luo and the Rek Dinka escalated and involved the SPLA-IO and SSPDF.

There have also been persistent clashes, both on the border with Lakes—with the Gok Dinka of Cueibet (Akony and Panyar sections)—and among Rek Dinka sections. Tensions focus on the toic areas within Manyangok payam and have generally seen the Yar, Muok, and Apuk Juwiir sections align themselves against the Thony, who then form an alliance with the Gok Dinka of Lakes, who use Manyangok as a base from which to raid other Rek communities. In 2021, however, a breakdown in the relationship between the Gok Dinka and the Thony meant that the latter group was surrounded by enemies on all sides.

The changing form of violence

The most notable aspect of the violence that has afflicted Greater Tonj since the signing of the R-ARCSS is its changing form. While conflict often centres on toic, and has

a seasonal rhythm—intensifying in the dry season with cattle movements in search of pasture—it has also increasingly become delinked from cattle raiding, and violence now targets towns, humanitarian resources, and entire populations, undermining the very possibility of co-existence between groups.

It is often difficult to distinguish between a ‘cattle raid’ and a violent attack, and almost impossible to make a distinction between political violence and inter-communal violence. The fundamental logic of ‘government war’—without the possibility of customary mediation or the payment of compensation—has become the logic of sectional war; concomitantly, the territorial and administrative logic of Dinka sections in Warrap has become a state-based logic, predicated on the absolute control of territory.

The nature of these clashes has further marginalized the customary authorities. Previously, such authorities would play a leading role in mediating between communities. Chiefs would then, by presiding over customary courts, determine how to redistribute cattle in compensation claims and thus enable a rapprochement between groups, as well as reaffirm moral codes of behaviour. The position of the chiefs, however, has been undermined. Customary authorities are still important, and continue to play an important role in the communities of Warrap but, due to the militarized transformations of the past few decades, they now largely rely on political and military connections to ensure their role; they are thus beholden to the government, which reduces their status, especially in the eyes of the *gelweng*.

It is not that the moral codes of prior decades have been abandoned; as Pendle (2021) has shown in other parts of Warrap, the population displays significant creativity in finding ways to live a moral life under conditions of extreme duress, and moral codes around warfare continue to evolve. In Warrap in 2018–22, however, the militarized logic of conflict created a state of war between communities that often led to the suspension of these codes. In the absence of a state that can provide legitimate security for the population, communities have all too often acted as states themselves, and engaged in governmental war against hostile populations. ●

“As South Sudan enters its fourth year of ‘peace’, everything has become war, and the South Sudanese government is the war’s cause rather than the solution.”

Conclusion

Another disarmament campaign had begun in Warrap state at the time this Report was being finalized. Division 11 of the SSPDF, along with the NSS, the South Sudanese National Police Service, and elements of both Tiger Division and the SSPDF's Division 3, had stationed themselves at a barracks in Tonj South. Gelweng cattle guards, many of them still in the toic and far from the disarmament locations, were sternly told that if they did not give up their weapons, they would be taken by force. Unsurprisingly, the gelweng are hesitant to disarm in the face of multiple threats to both their livestock and their communities, from other sections and from state forces. Disarmament seems even less appealing given that the SSPDF and the NSS have both been recruiting from—and thus arming—some communities even as they try to forcefully disarm others. Clashes between SSPDF Division 11 and gelweng from Awan Parek in June 2022, which left 65 dead, are an expression of the reality of disarmament: the gelweng are resisting the encroachment of a predatory state, which they believe no longer has legitimacy, but rather represents the particular interests of the commanders in question and the sections from which they come.

The violence scarring Warrap state comprises three levels, all of them inextricably political. As this Report has discussed, national politicians have instrumentalized sectional forces to fight wars of position in Juba. Local politicians have also inflamed inter-sectional rivalries to undermine opponents and press for administrative positions. At this first level, politicians instrumentalize sectional differences; rather than representing the state per se, they use constituency rivalries to attempt to gain positions that will allow them access to the state's coffers, now largely privatized and in the hands of the Office of the President.

At the second level, communities fight each other for prizes determined by the state. Since 2005, and more intensely since 2018, communities have fought for control of territorial boundaries—which, as they become formalized, are increasingly disputed—and to gain administrative positions that politicians have encouraged constituents to see in ethnic or sectional terms. These struggles are not archaisms; since the beginning of the South Sudanese state, there has been an enormous increase in both ethnic and sectional struggle, which is a real reflection of the rewards offered by the logic of political competition in South Sudan today. The clashes in Warrap are especially disturbing because the struggles are considered in absolute terms; the gelweng feel that, in protecting their communities, they are required to lay aside moral codes and compete against other sections, responding with the same extreme violence that has been meted out to them, in what have become existential struggles for survival.

While politicians instrumentalize the gelweng, and communities struggle with each other for control of the administrative structures of the South Sudanese state, the violence in Tonj East illustrates that the third level, which sees communities increasingly struggle against state forces themselves, is perhaps the most significant. As the predatory South Sudanese state functions by dividing people and setting them

against each other, the gelweng have progressively emerged as a mode of resistance, as much as they are also instrumentalized by forces within the state. While this does not offer a peaceful vision of the future of Warrap state, it does make one thing clear: as South Sudan enters its fourth year of 'peace', everything has become war, and the South Sudanese government is the war's cause rather than the solution. ●

Endnotes

- 1 For a summary of the disarmament campaign carried out in Tonj East, see UNSC (2020b, p. 12). For a summary of violence in Warrap in 2021, see ACLED (2021) and UNSC (2021, p. 5).
- 2 For an example of such an appeal, see UNSC (2020a).
- 3 Cattle guards in Warrap were originally referred to as *titweng*. Both *gelweng* and *titweng* translate as the protectors or guardians of livestock; *titweng* is used among the northern Dinka, while *gelweng* is used further south and has become the common term for both groups (Pendle, 2015). For convenience, this Report will use the term *gelweng* to refer to both groups.
- 4 Across South Sudan, since the signing of the R-ARCSS, would-be county commissioners have frequently opted to destabilize incumbent rivals by creating insecurity in the rival's home area. Their aim is to demonstrate the rival's inability to command control of a given county and thus try to push Kiir to appoint a new commissioner—one who is able to control the violence; such a person would, of course, likely be the instigator of the initial violence.
- 5 The power-sharing arrangement contained in the peace agreement means that all positions are appointed on the basis of party affiliation. For instance, five deputy ministerial portfolios are awarded to the incumbent regime, three to the SPLA-IO, and one to the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA). This method of apportioning continues all the way down the chain, with a 'responsibility-sharing ratio' allotted for state and local government positions: 55 per cent to the incumbent regime; 27 per cent to the SPLA-IO; 10 per cent to SSOA; and 8 per cent to the Opposition Political Parties (OPP) coalition.
- 6 Shortly after the signing of the R-ARCSS, Kiir renamed the SPLA as the SSPDF. This Report will refer to the South Sudanese army as the SPLA in reference to actions carried out before October 2018, and the SSPDF for actions carried out after that point.
- 7 For a further study of the limitations of considering South Sudan through the framework of ethnic politics, see Pendle (2020b).
- 8 The author's thinking about these issues is indebted to the work of Nicki Kindersley (2019) and Joseph Diing Majok (2019).
- 9 This Report makes use of interviews conducted by the author with customary authorities in Kuajok, Tonj North, Tonj South, Warrap town, and elsewhere in Warrap state (November 2021), and the work of the excellent scholars who have explored Warrap's political history at length elsewhere (Cormack, 2014; 2016; Pendle, 2015; 2017; 2018; 2020a; 2020b; 2021; Pendle and Madut Anei, 2018).

- 10 Like any such diagram, this triangle simplifies relations for the sake of clarity. The character of the SPLA during the second civil war was different from that of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) political elite during the CPA period, including in its relation to the *gelweng*; however, insofar as these actors are all seen by the people of Warrap as part of *hakuma*, or government (a form whose source of legitimacy is outside of the communities in question), this simplification provides analytical clarity.
- 11 Interviews with traditional authorities in Thiet, Greater Awuul, and elsewhere in Tonj North and South, November 2021.
- 12 Since at least the early 20th century, chiefs have had important roles in relation to cattle camps due to their ability to redistribute cattle following court rulings (Pendle, 2021, p. 883). There is often a mutually constitutive relationship between chiefs and cattle guards, with chiefs organizing the supply of food to the cattle camps but also relying on cattle guards to defend their chiefdoms and livestock.
- 13 It is important to underline that while large herds were built up by elites, most of the cattle keeping in Warrap state continues to be carried out at a smaller scale.
- 14 Warrap would remain divided into three states following Kiir's subsequent 32-state decree in January 2017.
- 15 Interviews with Warrap politicians, Warrap town and Kuajok, November 2021.
- 16 Interviews with Warrap politicians, Warrap town and Kuajok, November 2021.
- 17 Interview in Thiet town, 22 November 2021.
- 18 See Johnson, Verjee, and Pritchard (2018) and Pritchard and Verjee (2021).
- 19 Interviews with cattle herders, Tonj North, November 2021.
- 20 Interviews with Aurelio Deng, executive director for local government, Kuajok, Warrap state, 20 November 2021, and with Santino Deng Wek, state minister for cabinet affairs, Kuajok, Warrap state, 19 November 2021.
- 21 In an interview conducted in Tonj on 23 November 2021, the Paramount Chief of the Muok (Tonj South) estimated that the number of chiefs in Tonj South had increased from seven to 19.
- 22 Telar Ring Deng, the veteran Atuat politician, had rejoined Machar's SPLA-IO in February 2020 in anticipation of Lakes state going to the opposition (interviews with Warrap politicians, Juba, October and December 2021).
- 23 The Noi are from within the sections of Greater Awuul, which are themselves part of Greater Kuatchii, within the Rek Dinka section.
- 24 Interviews in Greater Awuul and Tonj South, November 2021. Anthony Bol Madut had cancer and had to go to South Africa for treatment, which is why he was relieved as governor.
- 25 The National Security Bill of 2014 was enacted into law in 2015 (GRSS, 2014).
- 26 Interviews with South Sudanese politicians, Juba, 2016 and 2017, and Addis Ababa, 2016.
- 27 When Malong was fired in May 2017, he fled Juba in a 13-vehicle convoy towards his home in Aweil, only to find his way blocked in Yirol, where Santino Deng Wol, then seemingly a Malong ally, mediated between Malong and Kiir, and convinced him to return to Juba (Boswell, 2019, pp. 10–11).
- 28 Other such forces include the militias under Gordon Koang in Koch county, the Bul Nuer militias under the Monyuil brothers in Mayom, and the forces of Ochan in Maiwut.
- 29 Interviews with NSS personnel, Renk, Warrap town, Bentiu, Pariang, and Juba, 2014–21.
- 30 Interviews with *gelweng*, Greater Awuul, November 2021.
- 31 Interviews with Warrap politicians, Juba, September–October 2021.

- 32 The same manoeuvre can be seen during the South Sudanese civil war when he weakened Eastern Nuer commanders, who lost power and influence in Greater Upper Nile, and reincorporated them into his coalition after the R-ARCSS (Craze, 2022b).
- 33 The media—and many analysts—reported that Kuc had been dismissed from the board. Officially, however, Kuc had never been on the board and was only offered a seat on it following Nhial's dismissal in April 2021.
- 34 Interview with NSS officer, Juba, October 2021.
- 35 The high turnover of governors illustrates a broader dynamic in South Sudan: governors are dismissed because of their inability to quell violence in their states, but then the reign of their successors tends to be predicated on the violent suppression of dissident elements—often those connected to older governors—leading to the replacement of these newer governors and the continuation of the cycle.
- 36 Interview in Warrap state, name and location withheld, November 2021.
- 37 Tragically, the men who were killed in the ambush were from Alabek payam and not Kirrik.
- 38 Interviews, Greater Awuul, names and locations withheld, November 2021.
- 39 Interview in Greater Awuul, name and location withheld, November 2021.
- 40 The subsections within Greater Kuatchii are the Atok and Noi (Warrap and Awul payam); Abiem Mayar (Manloor payam); Nyang Akoc (Pagol payam); and Ajak Leer (Kirrik payam). The subsections within Greater Akop are Lou Paher (Marial Lou); Apuk Padok (Akop); Lou Maiwen (Alabek); Juer (Alabek); Kongor (Aliek); and Awan Parek (Rualbet).
- 41 In July 2022, Manime Gatluak was assassinated by forces loyal to Stephen Buay Rolnyang's South Sudan People's Movement/Army (SSPM/A).
- 42 The pre-negotiation meetings occur between the Rek Dinka sections, on the one side, and the Jur, on the other, before negotiation meetings, to determine the Dinka migration into the Jur River during the dry season and bring the two sides together.
- 43 Interviews in Wau and the Jur River valley, Western Bahr el Ghazal state, names and locations withheld.
- 44 Interviews carried out in Greater Awuul in November 2021 suggest that the Ajak Leer sided with Awan Parek during these clashes after a Noi cattle owner took some Ajak Leer cattle, and the police refused to get involved or retrieve the livestock. The Ajak Leer interpreted this as a sign that the government supported the Noi, and therefore joined with Awan Parek in clashes against the Noi.
- 45 Author observations, Greater Awuul, November 2021.
- 46 Interview with an international conflict analyst, Juba, November 2021.
- 47 Such clashes, however, broke out again in April 2022 between Apuk Padoic and Lou Paher, over a particular toic called mashara.
- 48 The Luanyjang are divided into the Chierrup (Paweng), the Chiertoc (Pagor), the Nyangrup (Paliang), and the Nyangwiir (Makuach). The Nyangrup are further divided into the Arieu (Klunkuel), the Kongor (Madol), and the Pakom (Abior), while the Nyangwiir are further divided into the Akokluac (Ayook), the Klunadel (Wunnyeth), the Klunthuc (Mapara), and the Nyamhom (Cuiealek). The Chiertoc are divided into the Atek (Piotakou), Athor (Midher), and the Kuok (Pagor), while the Chierrup are divided into the Abuong (Juolgok), Lian (Kuelchuk), and Pariak (Pannhial). The Greater Ananatak are divided into the Akook (Ananatak), the Aliap (Ngabagok), the Jalwau (Wunlit), the Luachkoth (Palal), and the Thiik (Malualcum). The Jalwau are further divided into the Adoor, the Bac, the Kongor, and the Pakoor.
- 49 Tonj South is composed of the Apuk Juwiir (Jak and Thiet), the Muok (Tonj South), the Yar (Wathalel and Yar), and the Thony (Manyangok).

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A publication of the Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan project with support from the US Department of State